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Abstract 
In this article, we argue that those distracted by a continual critique of neoliberalism have 
missed its transition into a more conservative and sinister form that we term neopopulism. 
We explore how neopopulism has emerged in recent decades as the neoliberal project has 
failed. The groups most failed by neoliberalism, capitalism and the meritocracy have been 
encouraged to blame each other rather than the systems that have failed them. In this 
context, fear of minority groups, including religious minorities, has grown. We go on to 
explore how our recent research with faith-based community workers provides evidence for 
how some faith groups are resisting division and bringing people together in resistance to 
both neoliberal and neopopulist values. Our research involved interviews with participants 
from a range of faith traditions, some who were volunteers and some who were paid 
professionals for faith-based organisations and focuses primarily on their engagement with 
young people. We conclude that while the practices of these faith-based community 
workers present a challenge to neopopulism, a more explicit resistance to the fear and 
suspicion borne out of this context is needed. 
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Over centuries, since long before state services existed, faith-based groups and 
organisations have engaged with their communities. Faith-based forms of community work 
have been key to the development of varying expressions of community development. 
These fields of practice have an often-antagonistic relationship with states and institutions 
due to their common principles of operating from the ‘grassroots’ rather than ‘top-down’, 
and as a result of their facilitation of empowerment and critical consciousness, rather than 
of compliance. For example, the Sunday Schools of the late 1700s that taught young people 
to read and write, were criticised for giving working class young people such power, lest 
they challenge the social order (Thompson, 2018). In this article, we explore how 
contemporary faith-based community work has a role to play in resisting both neoliberalism 
and right-wing populism. Whilst our own research is located in the UK, debates around 
neoliberalism, populism, resistance and social justice have international resonance, with the 
detrimental impacts of capitalism and division being felt globally. 
This article draws on empirical research with faith-based youth and community workers in 
England and Scotland. Emerging themes include promoting inclusion and striving for justice 
in faith-based work; asset-based approaches to community practice that possibilise and 
reclaim grass-roots co-production in regenerating different forms of capital; challenging 
neoliberal discourses of ‘deficit’ and ‘risk’; and recreating civil-democratic and dialogical 
spaces. In contextualising this, we explore how the rise of neoliberalism since the late 
twentieth century has seen community and youth work distorted to focus on people’s 
deficits rather than their potential, to promote individualism over collectivism, and has been 
subject to a measurable ‘value for money’ agenda that ignores the softer, long-term 
outcomes of the work in favour of the values of the market (Davies, 2019; Duffy, 2017; 
Taylor et al, 2017).  
We argue that in recent years, neoliberalism has morphed into something more sinister that 
we term neopopulism.1 A key shift in context between these ideologies has been the move 
from any attempt to lay claim to liberal values (Zizek, 2018). Instead, discourses of division 
and fear have been politicised with marginalised groups further stigmatised. Academics and 
practitioners, distracted by a continued critique of neoliberalism, have arguably missed this 
subtle shift. For example, our conceptualising of neopopulism is related to, but distinct 
from, Featherstone’s (2008) work on populism. He argues resistance to the globalizing and 
homogenising agenda of neoliberalism can be manifest as exclusionary nationalist practices 
seeking to prevent transnational alliances. We argue, however, that neopopulism is not 
disconnected from capitalism and neoliberalism, rather it has emerged from the predictable 
failure of these forces to meet their espoused egalitarian and distributive aims. Our research 
demonstrates how faith-based community workers seek to resist this oppressive culture, 
which echoes dark facets of human history, by bringing people together to resist division 
and fear.  
Successive post-2010 UK governments have implemented years of austerity. Moves towards 
localism and decentralised decision making have been integral to implementing this agenda. 
Government has become governance (Miller and Rose, 2008). Yet, despite this ostensible 
new localism, more radical forms of community development practice have fared badly 
under austerity. Given the tensions created by fiscal reductions and increasingly targeted 
state-investment, it might be argued that the resultant ‘austerity localism’ has been a 
‘Trojan horse’ strategy for state withdrawal of support for work which it deemed inefficient, 
or politically undesirable.  
However, austerity has perhaps also rendered visible much of the work of grassroots faith 
communities. For example, the largest UK foodbank provider, the Trussell Trust which 
operates from Christian foundations and principles, has increased its services and 
campaigns significantly since the 2008 recession. Similarly, Sikh communities have actively 
welcomed homeless people into their Gurdwaras to share Langar, as well as in some cases, 
taking Langar outside the Gurdwara to feed local people who need it (Singh, 2015). In 2017, 
faith communities responded to the London Grenfell Tower fire by opening churches and 
mosques to provide food and shelter and to act as distribution centres for donations to 
those affected. Alongside this, faith groups were part of the movement of local activists and 
groups coming together to hold government and austerity policies to account for this 
tragedy. As such, we argue that faith-based community and youth work can be seen not 
only to meet need, but to name and challenge injustices (Pimlott, 2015). The faith-based 
community and youth workers in our research are resisting neoliberalism and neopopulism 
through their work to bring people together, to challenge the stigmatisation of 
communities, and to resist the asset-stripping that governments have imposed on young 
people and communities. 
 
Morphology: neoliberalism to neopopulism – the devil that came in the night 
Drawing on Apple (2013), Tania de St Croix (2016:27) sums up neoliberalism as ‘an almost 
religious ideology in which the private and the market are necessarily good, and the public is 
seen as bad’. Under this rubric, the rule of the market is hegemonized, public services, and 
those who use them are stigmatised and discoursed as problematic. In this article, we argue 
that capitalism and its espoused claims of meritocracy, merely attempt to disguise widening 
inequality and obscure growing structural inequities through thinly-veiled discourses of 
blame. Neoliberalism was always destined to fail large groups of people, who now, more 
than ever, must be victimised, blamed, and even eliminated in order to justify the rubric of 
capitalist logic. In this section, we explore how the key characteristics of neoliberalism have 
allowed it to morph from a questionable public discourse that cements austerity and 
financial stringency, into a widely accepted new public discourse that both abandons any 
sense of the liberal values that supposedly underpinned it, rendering its evolution as 
neopopulism even more dangerous and divisive. 
The neoliberal climate is characterised by its emphasis on marketization, on shrinking the 
state and providing a free market for public services that can identify clearly their outputs 
and demonstrate return on investment. One of the clear challenges of this context for 
voluntary and community services is that it promotes competition rather than collaboration. 
Organisations compete for funding, and in times of austerity, from a smaller pot than was 
previously available. However, this undermining of collaboration and solidarity is by no 
means simply an unfortunate by-product of financial stringency. Solidarity has been 
systematically undermined, as seen in the UK through anti-lobbying restrictions on charities, 
increasingly punitive responses to protest, and the undermining of trade unions (de St Croix, 
2016; Mayo, 2017).  As such, individualisation has been purposefully unleashed as a 
mechanism of neoliberal rationality to espouse meritocratic ideals: that those who work 
hard will do well, but those who fail have not worked hard enough. This individualisation 
has permeated public and political discourse over the last forty years. It obscures social 
inequalities, allowing them to go unaddressed. Far from supporting the reality of the 
meritocracy, the neoliberal era has precipitated widening inequalities between rich and 
poor. This is particularly exacerbated for those belonging to minority groups (Mayo, 2017).  
A secondary characteristic of the neoliberal project has been its focus on people as in deficit 
and at risk, and its increased surveillance and control of people. This appears significant 
given the illusion of a smaller state (de St Croix, 2016; Mayo, 2017; Pimlott, 2015). In this 
context, universal youth and community services have seen reduced funding in the UK, 
whilst funding that remains is centred on controlling a problem or fixing people’s ‘failings’. 
Examples of this include the use of counter-terrorism budgets to address potential 
radicalisation, or projects to prevent teenage pregnancy, crime and anti-social behaviour. 
Such interventions are more focused on surveillance and control than on empowerment and 
autonomy. Indeed, the values of the meritocracy necessitate that we view those in need of 
welfare or intervention as at fault; as lazy, greedy or morally corrupt and, ultimately, 
responsible for their own failure, having refused to use their own agency to succeed.  
The top-down deficit-focused policies that have emerged in this period have fed, rather 
than challenged, global populist discourses; the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy, ‘Prevent’, 
is a pertinent example. Such policies create division and intolerance in which people fear 
and blame each other for societal problems, rather than seeing them as symptoms of 
structural inequalities that have been cemented by neoliberal governments. Mayo (2017) 
explains how blame for the housing crisis in London, created through disinvestment in social 
housing, has been diverted onto migrants, and feeds wider discourses about immigration as 
bad. Mayo argues that, on a global scale, as neoliberal austerity policies have increased 
inequality, people have sought more radical alternatives leading to a polarisation in politics. 
The ‘radical right’ has gained significant traction in this context, resulting in the growth of 
right-wing populism. 
We identify this context as neopopulism and argue that it is both related to neoliberalism, 
and distinct from it. It is a context that has emerged as the neoliberal promise of prosperity 
has remained unfulfilled for many, with inequalities worsening in a culture in which 
individualism has become deeply ingrained. Younger generations find themselves stripped 
of assets (Bright, Pugh and Clarke, 2018) and significantly worse off than the generations 
before them. Yet, these generations have been both divested of assets and indoctrinated in 
a societal discourse that obscures structural inequalities and stigmatises those with the 
least. These generations look beneath, rather than above them, for targets for their anger 
and frustration, and politicians and governments mobilise and reinforce this as a convenient 
distraction from what the state might otherwise be doing. We argue that as neoliberalism 
has failed, that instead of something more social democratic emerging, something more 
sinister has been birthed.  This is no accident. Governments who have used practice and 
policy to demonise and manage certain groups of people, fuel blame for failure of 
neoliberalism. It has been achieved through undermining solidarity, stigmatising groups who 
hold little power to resist, and the political mobilisation of fear and division. 
Analyses of neoliberalism in relation to community and youth work recognise it has shifted 
to something more than financial efficacy and stringency. Tania de St Croix, for example, 
states: 
While it is important to acknowledge the influence of the 2008 financial crash and its 
global impact on public spending, an exclusive focus on this ‘most visible’ area of 
change can risk obscuring the broader direction of travel. The current phase of cuts, 
closures and redundancies are presented by governments as unfortunate but 
inevitable… However, the so-called financial ‘crisis’ has not disrupted the major 
political parties’ ongoing devotion to the market; rather, in the years following the 
crash, social inequalities and traditionalist values became more deeply embedded. 
(de St Croix, 2016: 14) 
Here, de St Croix touches on the idea that the liberal values purported to underpin the 
neoliberal project have shifted to a more ‘traditionalist’ set of values. Similarly, Mayo (2017) 
recognises increasing populism in the neoliberal era, framing it as a symptom of the failure 
of market forces. These analyses have failed to fully articulate what neoliberalism has 
morphed into; we argue that a continuing focus on critiquing neoliberalism in such analyses 
only serves to distract from the shift in ideology and values underpinning neoliberalism as it 
gives way to creeping neopopulism. Within this shift, there has been a move from any 
attempt to claim adherence to liberal values, to an embracing of deeply conservative ones. 
The levels of mistrust, suspicion and control that have emerged through neopopulism go 
beyond the neoliberal project. For example, right-wing nationalist movements driven by 
hate and division have been politically mobilised in the election campaigns of Donald 
Trump, Boris Johnson and the referendum of the UK’s membership of the EU.  Elements of 
these campaigns have been explicitly racist. The UK Independence Party (UKIP), for 
example, unveiled a poster portraying a long line of refugees from ethnic minority groups 
with the words ‘breaking point’ during the Brexit referendum. This was an image which was 
both misleading and served to mobilise hostility towards refugees and asylum-seekers by 
dehumanising them. We argue that neopopulism emerged in the neoliberal era, first seen 
following events like 9/11, but is now a powerful force more dominant and more sinister 
than neoliberalism. It has emerged as capitalism, neoliberalism and the meritocracy have 
continually failed certain groups of people whilst obscuring the social inequalities they face. 
Politicians, media and public discourse have mobilised against the groups most pertinently 
failed by these systems. These most failed groups have become both the objects of blame 
for their own failure and the reason behind the hardships experienced by other groups who 
have also been failed by the neoliberal project. This is a politically driven narrative that 
accounts for the failures of capitalism and supports the continuation of the current system 
of economics. As such, neopopulism is a global force that mobilises right-wing, nationalist 
movements to obscure the failures of neoliberal capitalism by blaming and ‘othering’ the 
most vulnerable, usually minority, groups. 
In this context, fear of ‘the religious’ has grown, particularly in relation to minority ethnic 
and religious communities. The ‘othering’ of such groups is seen most pertinently in both 
Islamophobia and the fear of immigrants across the Western world, particularly where they 
emigrate from poorer contexts to our own. The hostility that stems from this fear extends to 
refugees and asylum seekers, who have been reframed from being seen as in need, to 
groups whose motivations for migration are not to be trusted. The public discourse about 
them has taken a sinister turn. References to refugees as ‘terrorists’ and ‘cockroaches’ have 
been deployed by public media (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human 
Rights, 2018). In relation to young Muslims, Khan (2013) refers to the deployment of 
discourses of ‘theyification’. Similarly, Jeldtoft (2013) argues that negative and hyper-visible 
public discourses about Islam frame Muslims so powerfully that the everyday realities of 
their lives are not seen. The growth of exclusion and ‘othering’ of religious groups in this 
context has led the faith-based community workers in our study to seek both safe spaces for 
their communities, and opportunities for dialogue between their communities and the 
societal discourses that exclude them (Bright et al, 2018).  
 
Community development and resistance  
A key debate in community development over recent decades, has centred on tensions 
between working with assets or responding to the deficits in communities. This debate sits 
within wider tensions between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ practices, and between radical 
and consensus forms of community development. State-funded and mainstream services 
have been critiqued for imposing top-down assessments of problems within particular 
groups and communities that can increase stigmatisation and thus exacerbate rather than 
address such problems. The UK’s Counter-terrorism strategy (Prevent), for example, 
presents a particularly problematic top-down strategy that increases suspicion and fear of 
Muslim communities. This policy has been criticised for increasing stigmatisation and 
isolation (Abbas and Awan, 2015). Whilst ‘community cohesion’ had a focus in policy 
discussions in the early twenty-first century, it has been undermined by an ideological 
commitment to austerity and deficit-focused policy interventions such as Prevent (Mayo, 
2017). 
Asset-focused forms of community development have emerged in Western contexts during 
the last few decades as a form of community self-help, becoming popular in the UK in early 
twenty-first century. Asset-based community development (ABCD) has often been 
celebrated as the solution to problematic policy-making (McKnight and Kretzmann, 2012). It 
is based on the idea that by focusing on ‘capacity, skills, knowledge, connections and 
potential in a community’, practitioners and services are able to see beyond ‘problems that 
need fixing’ (IDeA, 2010: 7). It critiques practices that focus on people’s deficits and argues 
that people need to be part of shaping their own solutions. However, whilst ABCD has a 
clear role to play in reducing top-down stigmatising of communities, it has been argued that 
it may overlook inequalities, or, even reinforce them (MacLeod and Emejulu, 2014). 
Focusing solely on assets rather than problems may lead to the needs of particular 
communities being disregarded. As such, it is argued that the turn towards a focus on assets 
rather than needs in community development has in some cases further legitimated 
neoliberalism, funding cuts and inequalities (MacLeod and Emejulu, 2014). Therefore, whilst 
there is a clear rationale for focusing on community assets rather than defining people and 
communities by their problems, for interventions to be progressive, they arguably also need 
to actively resist neoliberal discourses of self-help and austerity. 
In reaction to the neoliberal project, Featherstone et al (2011) have introduced the concept 
of ‘progressive localism’. Featherstone et al critique ‘austerity localism’ as simply the latest 
implementation of the politically-driven neoliberal agenda to reduce welfare provision. They 
argue that more progressive forms of localism are needed that actively resist neoliberalism. 
Such forms of localism recognise that as inequalities continue to grow, excluded groups 
need community development responses that resist neoliberal ideas of ‘self-help’, and that 
campaign for their needs to be met through state investment. Beyond this, there is a further 
need to challenge the division and inequality created by the neopopulist discourses of 
division and fear. According to Featherstone et al, progressive localism involves local 
organisations working together to resist, rather than collude with, problematic policy 
discourses. Such progressive local partnerships that bring people and groups together could 
arguably play a role in resisting neopopulism. This form of practice would go beyond 
plugging gaps left by state funding cuts to challenge inequality and individualism, thus 
resisting both neoliberalism and neopopulism. 
In our research, we found that faith-based community workers were developing progressive 
partnerships based on ‘border crossings’ (Coburn, 2010; Giroux, 2005) that bring people and 
groups together to build community, and challenge division and mistrust. In the previous 
analysis of our data, we found that these community workers were facilitating ‘inclusion 
within’ by providing safe spaces for excluded groups, and ‘inclusion without’ by developing 
collaborative work with and between their own faith community, other faith groups, and 
the wider community (Bright et al, 2018). Whilst resistance, protest and solidarity have been 
systematically undermined during the neoliberal era (Pimlott, 2015; de St Croix, 2016), we 
argue that faith-based community workers are generating resistance through such 
progressive local partnerships. As noted earlier, a key example of this was seen after the 
Grenfell Tower fire tragedy in west London in 2017 where over 70 people were killed, when 
local faith communities were a key part of working together with other community groups, 
of different faiths and no faith, to respond to the needs of victims, create community 
solidarity and hold the government to account. 
 
Our research with faith-based youth and community workers 
This article draws on research conducted with nine faith-based community workers in the 
UK from a range of faith backgrounds (Muslim, Sikh, Buddhist, Jewish and Christian). Some 
were volunteers while others were paid professionals working for faith-based organisations. 
The research aimed to draw out rich qualitative description. We used Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) which involves in-depth thematic analysis within and 
across small samples of data (Smith, Flowers and Larkin, 2009). The initial write-up of our 
study appears as a chapter in the SAGE Handbook of Youth Work Practice (Bright et al, 
2018). 
For the purposes of this article, we have revisited our analysis of the data from this study to 
explore what it tells us about how grassroots faith-based community development is 
responding to and resisting both neoliberalism and neopopulism. It should be noted that 
whilst our research participants were working across their faith communities, the focus of 
the original study was on work with young people in particular; thus, the data contains more 
about their work with young people than with other age groups. 
The main themes that emerged from our original analysis were as follows: 
1. Engagement: the forms of practice used by faith-based youth and community 
workers 
2. Education: the pedagogical approaches that underpin these methods of 
engagement 
3. Ethics: the values and purposes of the work including a strong focus on facilitating 
inclusion. 
In this paper, we identify new sub-themes that illustrate how the engagement practices of 
the faith-based community workers challenge neoliberalism and neopopulism, using an 
educational approach that centres on border pedagogies (Coburn, 2010; Giroux 2005), and 
that draws on an ethical framework encompassing values that resist division and fear. 
 
Faith beyond walls 
A spectrum of practice emerged from our research interviews. This ranged from open access 
youth work that was open to all young people, to more specific faith teaching for those from 
within, or wanting to engage with, the teaching of faith traditions. Another realm of 
engagement was inter-faith work which brought young people of different faiths together. 
Other forms of dialogical work included engaging with the local communities in which faith 
organisations were located. These practices included enacting commitments to meet social 
and community needs, and to break down intolerance and misunderstandings about the 
faith group. These approaches, in particular, can be viewed as a bulwark against neopopulist 
discourses. They demonstrate a deep commitment to breaking down divisions and enabling 
community ‘border crossings’.  
 
Responding to austerity  
Research participants were keenly aware of how their work with young people and 
communities contributed to civil society. Given the climate of neoliberalism and austerity, 
they appeared acutely aware of gaps in service provision, and how the work they did was 
able to challenge this deficit. Respondents’ work spanned small social action projects to 
taking over local authority provision that was no longer funded:  
So what we’ve done in the past is we’ve got a group of kids, Muslim kids, Christian 
kids, gone down to the local supermarkets who support what we do, and then the 
foodbank collection so we hand people leaflets if they want to donate for us, and 
then the food that people give us within that hour, our trolleys full of food and we’ll 
walk it round to the local foodbank and give it to them there. (Steven, a Revert 
Muslim Youth worker with an inter-faith organisation) 
So we have, well we have a centre… a council property… that was going redundant 
because of the lack of youth work that there was in the city. So we took on that and 
picked up an existing, sort of existing project that they ran as a youth, open access 
youth project provision there. And we had previously ran one here, which we’d closed 
down due to residents’ complaints, we had a very high volume of young people, 
roughly about, well between 120 and 140 on a Friday night, and of that about 90% of 
those were traveller young people. So they caused significant issues in a quite 
affluent area of York so we had to shut down before, before we were shut down, but 
the council approached us and asked us to re-open that at this new youth centre 
which is nearer the traveller sites and also it’s a real area of need in York where it is. 
So, we agreed. So we run that on a Friday night. (Beth, a Christian youth worker). 
Whilst Beth was the only example of a faith-based worker taking over the running of local 
authority provision, the other youth and community workers were also keen to frame their 
work as contributing to civil society. For example, Steven explained how through social 
action projects such as litter picking, Muslim young people in particular were able to 
challenge perceptions of their community as ‘problematic citizens’. Similarly, Balraj, a Sikh 
youth worker, explained how socio-political engagement was a key element of his practice, 
with his young people engaging in protests and campaigns in actively resisting austerity and 
right-wing populism. Warsan, a Muslim youth worker, framed the purpose of setting up a 
Muslim Scouts group as a diversion from anti-social activities for young people, who weren’t 
accessing (and/or felt excluded from) other provisions on offer. Even Jim, a Christian youth 
worker who was explicit about the ultimate purpose of his work being to share the Christian 
faith, was running a youth club to serve local young people that he described as having ‘no 
agenda’. Some of these practices, as well as responding to neoliberal austerity, were 
challenging neopopulist discourses that stigmatise religious and minority groups. 
 
Resisting individualisation  
Our research participants appeared to be resisting the neoliberal focus on individualism, 
self-help, resilience and meritocracy in their work with young people. Their practice was 
built on recognising the need for reciprocal relationships between people and on fostering 
interdependence and inter-generational support through, for example, mentoring and 
mediation. As well as challenging neoliberal values of individualism and its flawed notion of 
resilience, the practice of bringing generations together also challenges the division and fear 
between generations that is present in neopopulist discourses, where the young are 
demonised, rather than the impact of austerity and asset-stripping being recognised. 
Forging relationships with young people, between young people, and between young 
people and the wider faith community were key aspects of our participants’ practice. The 
commitment to generational mentoring was perhaps most central for the Buddhist 
volunteers. 
I mean the main, we refer to him as the President Ukedu, if you like the teacher, 
almost like a mentor, in terms of practicing his Buddhism his main focus, one of the 
main focusses he has is encouraging the youth. Yeah, I mean guidance and 
encouragement is quite significant in terms of, a lot of energy’s put into thinking 
about the young people in terms of their futures in a way, yeah. (Kana) 
I have got my mentor in life [name] who is a Buddhist leader and he really 
encourages us to nurture the future, to nurture the youth because, you know, 
obviously you have to have someone to do young people, they are the [unclear] of 
the future, and it’s not just this life but it's continues eternally. (Saori) 
Similarly, Jim, a Christian youth worker, explained how building relationships, family and 
community was a significant part of his role: 
So what we try and do is say ‘well, we’ve got, we’ve got a community here that 
young people can be part of and feel valued in, that’s brilliant... And so, like I’ve been 
really, I have been really pro-active in the church, trying to integrate young people 
with the life of the church, recognising that they need that community… I think it’s 
quite rare for like a young person to drop out of their wider family, as in their blood 
family. So you kind of think well, that, you know, some would, for various reasons, 
but actually on the whole, and so you think well why do they drop out of church, they 
obviously don’t see it as family or a community that they can connect with, or belong 
to or be part of, or are valued by. So it’s easy to walk away.  
This challenging of generational division and creation of generational chains challenges the 
mistrust between generations and asset-stripping of the young that is prevalent in the 
neoliberal and neopopulist era. 
 
Changing power dynamics and challenging hierarchies 
Neoliberalism and neopopulism have encouraged heavy governance of the young, yet the 
participants in our study were attempting to break down such hierarchies of control within 
their communities. Encouraging young people’s participation and voice were significant 
within their work to build relationships and community. They were facilitating young 
people’s ability to have a say and contribute to the faith community, often breaking down 
institutional barriers in order to achieve this. They viewed themselves as mediators between 
young people and the faith community. Jim, for example, explained that: 
Well I think one of the roles of the youth work in this context is a sort of mediator and 
almost as a voice for the young people. So there’s a voice for the young people 
speaking into the systems and infrastructure of the church which can become very 
rigid, very much like ‘this is how we do things’ and ‘these are the boxes you tick’ and 
all that stuff and obviously young people don’t operate like that. So there’s a role of 
kind of balancing the gap I think of, and trying to help young people to recognise that 
they can have a voice, and they can have a voice within the life of the church and that 
they, they are a valid, valued part of life at the church and they’re not, ‘oh those kids’ 
or whatever they might see that they’re seen as, or some people might even see 
them like. So I think that in my role there is very much that voice thing and as the 
mediator.  
Similarly, Balraj outlined how he had worked to help Sikh young people have more of a voice 
at his Gurdwara and even to sit on the committee. 
So there was really two key things, one was young people not feeling that they had 
any ownership or much kind of engagement activities in the Gurdwara, and then the 
kind of older populations wanting young people to be involved but nobody was 
coming up with the solutions to well, how do we bridge this gap a wee bit… We’ve 
now actually got young people that sit on the trustee boards of the Sikh Centre which 
has never actually happened before. 
Warsan also explained how her role involved mediating between young people and leaders 
of the Mosque.  
The practice of mediation also extended beyond single faith traditions for some of the 
research participants who were actively seeking to create a sense of community between 
young people of different faiths and no faith. This was most explicit for Steven and Mark, 
whose roles were specifically concerned with promoting inter-faith dialogue and cohesion 
between young people. However, as we explore later, it also featured in other respondents’ 
accounts and forms a key way in which they were resisting neopopulism. 
 
Working together  
Working between different faiths and groups was a key theme across the interviews. By 
collaborating, rather than competing, participants in the study engaged in resisting market-
values of neoliberalism and the divisions created by neopopulism. This was most apparent 
in the work of the inter-faith organisation for whom both Mark and Steven worked. Each 
outlined how creating a sense of community and friendship between young people of 
different faiths was central to their work. However, such inter-faith work was also explicit in 
other respondents’ narratives. Warsan, for example, outlined how her Muslim Scouts group 
has engaged with the local Christian and Sikh Scouts group: 
Recently we organised a faith show, so like the Mosque, the Gurdwara and the 
Church which was really good, like they got to speak to like, like I think there was for 
the Church there was a priest and for the Mosque it was just like one of the boy 
trustees and I think the same for the Gurdwara. 
Daniel, a Jewish youth worker, was also engaging in inter-faith work: 
We go outside the community and talk to other faith groups and particularly, I think, 
politically it’s very important for Jews and Muslims to be talking as much as possible. 
So yeah, that’s part of the work. 
Other youth workers who weren’t engaging in explicit inter-faith work, emphasised how 
young people of other faiths were welcome and had attended their activities. Within these 
collaborative practices, a pedagogical approach of facilitating dialogue and crossing borders 
between communities and groups, was apparent. These approaches represent grassroots 
attempts to foster inclusion and understanding, which challenge neopopulist discourses of 
division and mistrust. 
 
Safe dialogical spaces – resisting didacticism and fostering inclusion 
As well as seeking to work with other faiths, research participants described the importance 
of creating safe spaces for young people of their particular faith community. This facet of 
practice predominantly took the shape of sessions run primarily for young people 
subscribing to a particular faith tradition. For example, Warsan’s Muslim Scout group was 
created as a safe space for the young people in her community to gather and engage with 
each other. Warsan described this work as being concerned with developing a safe, inclusive 
space for a group that often experiences stigma and exclusion in other contexts. This is 
particularly pertinent for those groups most heavily stigmatised under neopopulism, such as 
young Muslims. Other respondents framed similar spaces as somewhere young people 
could ask questions or discuss difficult subjects in a faith-specific environment. This was 
often seen as a safer space to engage in such dialogue than within wider faith institutions 
where barriers to questioning might exist. Beth explained of her Christian youth group: 
it’s about discussion, it’s not really about saying this is the law and this is what we 
think, it’s more about finding out what they think and why and encouraging them to 
ask the ‘whys’ rather than just agreeing because we’ve told them that’s the way it is. 
Daniel explained that his Jewish youth group was a safe space to discuss LGBT issues in 
particular. His inclusive approach meant that a range of young people, including LGBT and 
atheistic Jews, were able to access the sessions and openly discuss their own interpretations 
of what it means to be Jewish and LGBT. In his inter-faith work, Steven explained that he 
was able to create spaces where young people of different faiths, as well as those who were 
agnostic or of no faith, could raise questions. Balraj demonstrated an innovative approach 
to creating a safe space for Sikh young people to discuss issues they were facing, through an 
online strategy to support young people who were facing negative experiences at school 
due to their Sikh faith. These safe spaces created by the youth and community workers 
allowed for a form of dialogical pedagogy away from the didacticism often experienced in 
religious and other institutions. The need to foster such safe, inclusive spaces for young 
people of faith, and particularly those from minority religions or facing other intersections in 
their identities, was at least in part a response to the stigma created by neopopulism. 
 
Challenging division and fear 
Neopopulist discourses of division, fear and mistrust have been reinforced by problematic 
policy-making and practice, perhaps more pertinently in counter terrorism narratives, as 
well as through media reporting of minority groups as problematic, such as reporting on 
refugees and migrants. Our research participants were keenly aware of the impact of such 
discourses on their communities and a key aspect of their faith-based community 
development practice was providing a positive representation of the faith tradition or 
community to the wider public. This was particularly deliberate where youth and 
community workers felt faith communities were misunderstood and subject to negative 
stereotyping. Mark explained how he had worked with the Muslim community in his area to 
open up the mosque to people of other faiths to help break down misunderstandings. Mark 
also described how he and his organisation refused to do any inter-faith work where there 
was any inference that they should address radicalisation. Indeed, his and Steven’s 
organisation was deeply committed to promoting the values of ABCD and to resisting a 
deficit focus: 
I think it was only last month we got offered a large amount of money and I can’t 
remember who, it was like an anti-extremism unit, and that’s now changed, oh it was 
anti-terrorism and it’s now changed to extremism, but it’s kind of the same group of 
people running a different department with a slightly bigger pot of money and 
they’re offering it and we’re like, no we can’t, as nice as the money would be, we’re 
not going to be used as your inter-faith gurus to help you with that kind of thing. 
(Mark, Christian youth worker with an inter-faith organisation) 
Similarly, Balraj described how he opened up his local Gurdwara for public events including 
charity events, tours and visits, with the explicit aim of enabling connection with, and 
learning about the local Sikh community. 
The Gurdwara’s always open like last year we did, I remember, we did count that had 
50,000 visitors that came to Gurdwara last year… One of the first things we did back 
in 2012 was we did like a charity event, and we raised funds for a local children’s 
hospital that needed to raise funds for a new wing that they were making of this 
hospital. So we did a fundraising event and we fundraised almost £8000 for that 
because we managed to get all of the community together. 
At times the voice of the community was used to challenge discriminatory practices in the 
work place more formally. In this example, Balraj highlights how the Sikh community were 
able to influence a large high street chain to change their policy across Scotland, after the 
experience of one local woman: 
Two years ago we had a woman who was refused a job at [a high street shop]; she 
went through the interview process, she was given a full offer of employment in 
writing, and on the day that she arrived at work they said that she would have to 
take off her Sikh articles of faith like the bangle, because she was in breach of the 
health and safety policy, and if she would not do that then she would have to leave 
the premises and she would no longer be able to work there. So, like that in itself 
presents a problem. You know we obviously fought that case and it was fine, she got 
the job back and [the company] changed their policy... 
This theme also overlaps with the ‘Working Together’ theme discussed above. However, the 
distinction lies in the difference in intent – one being to represent minority and 
misunderstood faith communities to the wider public, the other being to facilitate 
relationships between people of different faiths for their own sake. This positive 
representation and building of community relationships was the most pertinent way that 
our research participants were resisting the fear and hate created by neopopulism rather 
than simply the individualism that comes with neoliberalism. 
 
Conclusion 
The faith-based community and youth work we encountered in our research appears to 
represent a form of asset-based community development – with the community workers 
working with communities in positive and empowering ways. In many cases, they are doing 
this where funding for community development activity is scarce or misplaced. There is a 
question to be raised about whether these practices collude with the state rather than 
offering an active resistance to neoliberalism, by plugging gaps in provision and reinforcing 
the ideologies of austerity and community-led self-help. For example, Beth’s work to replace 
local authority provision could be seen as either a challenge to neoliberalism and austerity 
or a collusion with it, by reinforcing that such work should be delivered by communities 
rather than the state (MacLeod and Emejulu, 2014; Featherstone et al, 2011). 
However, there are indications in our findings of faith-based community work seeking to 
actively challenge the discourses of division and fear promoted by neopopulism. For 
example, and perhaps most explicitly, in the work of Steven and Mark to bring young people 
of different faiths together, and the activism and protests engaged in by Balraj and his Sikh 
youth group. 
As such, we argue that faith-based community development is going some way to resist the 
forces of neoliberalism and neopopulism, and the values of individualism, deficit, and fear 
that underpin these forces – through bringing different communities and groups together. 
However, there is a need for a clearer understanding of neopopulism and, with this, 
community development activists, both faith-based and not, could be doing more to 
explicitly protest, resist and speak out against neopopulist discourses. 
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1 Neopopulism is a concept that has gained some limited traction in academic literature, particularly in relation 
to Latin American countries. Much of this literature refers to neopopulism as founded in overt right-wing 
dictatorships, to which neoliberal and democratic ideals became hopeful antidotes. We, however, use the 
term differently to refer to the re-emergence of right-wing populism arising from the failure of neoliberalism 
to deliver on its espoused distributive objectives.  
